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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1980-1981
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. As announced in last year's symposium, the title has been changed to
Developments in the Law to reflect expanded coverage of legislative amendments in
Louisiana and of federal statutes and decisions of interest to the Louisiana lawyer.
However, the symposium continues to cover primarily decisions of Louisiana courts. This
year's symposium includes cases decided from March, 1980 through March, 1981.1
PRIVATE LAW
AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP
Milton M. Harrison*
MANDATE
It is axiomatic that an agent, who acts within the authority
granted to him by a principal who has been disclosed as the contrac-
ting party, does not incur contractual liability; the principal alone is
obligated.' In Roll-up Shutters, Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone
Co.,' the fourth circuit interpreted a clause limiting the liability of
the principal to be applicable to the agent as well. The agent
negotiated the contract on behalf of its principal for the sale of
advertising space in the principal's "Yellow Pages." The contract
provided that the principal's liability for any error or omission
would be limited to no more than the charges for the advertising.
There was an error in plaintiff's advertisement and suit was
brought against both principal and agent. The argument was made
that the contract limited the principal's liability only and not the
agent's, but the court properly held that the agent' incurred no
liability. The court did not deal with the situation which would have
arisen had the agent been negligent, inasmuch as no negligence was
proven here.
The general rule that mandates are revocable at the will of the
principal' is subject to the exception that grants of authority may be
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3013.
2. 394 So. 2d 796 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3028.
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made irrevocable when the agent is given, in addition to the man-
date, an interest in the thing authorizing him to act in his own
name.' An irrevocable mandate is not an agency in fact because the
agent is acting on his own behalf rather than for the principal. In
Brown v. Holland,' the third circuit interpreted a contract whereby
the defendants gave the plaintiff the exclusive right to act in their
behalf in securing possible royalty interests. The defendants agreed
to give the plaintiff one-half of "whatever royalty interest" he was
able to recover. The court held that the contract was mandate and
was therefore terminable at the will of the principals. This portion
of the decision is certainly correct.
The court, however, ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover on quantum meruit only, saying that the termination of the
mandate under article 3028 had the effect of ending the contract and
rendering its compensation provision unenforceable. It is submitted
that the decision is in error and the court should have ruled that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages. Articles 3072 and 3028 are not in-
tended to permit a principal to abrogate his contract without penal-
ty, but only give the power to terminate the authority. The court
also drew an analogy with the termination of the attorney-client
relationship. The analogy here is not a good one because the
jurisprudence whereby the courts supervise the amount of fees
charged by lawyers results from the courts' responsibility in super-
vising the bar; it does not come about because the attorney-client
relationship is one of mandate. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme
Court departed from quantum meruit as the basis for recovery in
Saucier6 and Scott.'
PARTNERSHIP
In Martinez v. Posner, Martinez and Padgett,' the third circuit
was confronted with the fundamental question of the nature of a
partner's interest in the assets of the partnership. Following a
dissolution of her marriage to one of the partners who owned a one-
third interest in the partnership, the plaintiff sought to be recognized
as an owner of a one-sixth interest in the partnership. Citing the ar-
ticles of the Louisiana Civil Code in effect prior to January 1, 1981,
4. Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So. 2d 197 (1946); Marchand v. Gulf Ref.
Co. of La., 187 La. 1002, 175 So. 647 (1937); Succession of Zatarain. 138 So. 2d 163 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962).
5. 392 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
6. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
7. Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 66 (La. 1979).
8. 385 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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the court held that no one is a partner except by the consent of all
other partners.' Therefore, the former wife of a partner, upon the
dissolution of the community of acquets and gains, does not receive
any interest in the partnership, but is entitled only to one-half of the
value of the husband-partner's interest in the partnership assets.
In a similar situation," a former wife claimed a one-half interest
in real property acquired during the marriage by her former hus-
band and his partner. If the property was owned by the partnership,
the former wife would not be entitled to ownership of the real pro-
perty; she would be entitled only to one-half of the value of the
former husband's interest in partnership assets, as in Martinez.
However, the property in this case had been transferred from the
partnership to a corporation in which the former husband was
owner of one-half of the shares of stock. The second circuit held that
the former wife was entitled only to one-half of the shares of cor-
porate stock but no interest in the real estate. Shareholders in a cor-
poration, like partners, are not owners of the things owned by the
corporation or partnership; they are owners of an interest in the
corporation or partnership.
9. Id. at 527 (citing LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2801, 2802, 2803, 2805, 2809 & 2810).
10. McAteer v. McAteer, 393 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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